In his great theory of the communicative action Jurgen Habermas 1 presents reality as action and divides it into two parts: teleological action and communicative action; he is, in particular, concerned also about "reason" (about "rationality") in its, as he thinks, Enlightenment meaning as single reason or distinguished reason 2 . At the same time Enlightenment reason includes Hobbes' and, especially, Lock's notion of many reasons in the process of agreement. In any case, Habermas discusses the question of reason with modern philosophers, from Kant, Heidegger, Derrida, Castoriadis, to Foucault and Luhmann. We may say that he is concerned about reality formulated in two main categories: reason and action. Apart from Habermas, we are not very concerned about the importance of the notion of reason 3 , nor about action. In our opinion, the more important thing is that reality (and its Habermas' understanding included) is in principle 1 J. Habermas, Th eorie des kommunikativen Handelns, F. a. M., 1987. 2 As he probably thinks; anyway, he is fully included into Enlightement paradigm. 3 Developed "enlightenment" notion of reason will be given below, however.
divided, and that the philosopher looks for the unity of the divided world. He fi nds unity, in Kantian tradition, in the standards of rational thinking or in scientifi c knowledge, taken by mediation of normative systems. Th e latter is close to the proposal presented below, although Habermas' variant is rather sociocultural than strictly philosophical. Are those his only keys for unity?
We stress the question of division and unity because we think they are primary. At the same time the stress on division and unity requires reformulation of the Habermas problem a little, before we propose and explain its general philosophical foundations. For that we would like to draw attention to his other terms: communication and intention for agreement. We think, if we want to abide by the discourse in the paradigm of communication, it would be better to hold the wholeness of being not as reason or action, but precisely as communication, and to divide reality into another two parts, into two main kinds of communication (instead of two kinds of reason, instrumental reason and communicative reason, and of two kinds of action: teleological and communicative); two parts consequently: communication as domination and communication as agreement, as intention and seeking for agreement. Th e term "communication", unlike "reason" or "action", doesn't need additional explanation about the mode of being -"communication" indicates immediately its proper structure and dynamics, whereas the former terms need complement: what kind of reason, what kind of action? Finally, communication will also need complement: what type of communication? 4 It is, of course, just the fi rst step of reformulation -it is description only, whereas we need a strictly philosophical, metaphysical formula, when we want to get and confi rm validity. We know that Habermas is very concerned about validity-everybody is concerned about validity. At the same time we cannot be sure what Habermas thinks about the duality of the world. He proposes to change one paradigm, instrumental action, into another-communicative action; so, reformulation is needed, fi rst of all, for the transition from description to explanation. It is the fi rst; the second: diff ering from Habermas, we don't leave out the old paradigm, the paradigm of teleology and domination, we keep both in mind, transformed according to communicative paradigme. In any case, how to ground all these divisions (two reasons, two actions, two types of communication fi nally), how to ground the division itself (the certain kind of "dualism" instead of the popular, simple, totaly unifi ed, not in principle divided unity), how to ground the distinction of communicative action in the frame of reality, totally fulfi lled (and apparently actualy fulfi lled) with determinism and domination, totally fulfi lled with instrumental reason, totally fulfi lled with the absence of subjects. At the same time there are some conceptually possible situations connected to the presence or absence of the subject: absence more than one subject, the presence of one subject as a subject of teleological action (god as a subject of action, of creation, nature as a subject, or every higher level of hierarchy as a subject), many subjects as the subjects of teleological actions only, and two subjects at least as the subjects of communicative relationship; the subjects are actually always present, but not always in the proper subject role. Th e subjectless, the fashionable postmodern subjectless, has probably much in common with linguistics' "language speaking human being". Th e subjectless discourse (rather than philosophy) transists particularity of sociocultural being (socialisation etc.) Th e general statement about reality in a philosophical meaning, reality as "everything", the statement performing whole reality as an "object". Anyway-is the reality principally divided? Is it divided, on the fundamental level, into two parts only? Has everything got a structure, is everything relationship? Are the sides (parts) of relationship in principle diff erent, is the reduction of one part of it to another in principle impossible? Is the transgression of this imposssibility possible? By the way, this transgression and the question of its possibility or impossibility has special philosophical meanings. And, fi rst of all, according to Habermas, is communicative action possible? Is communicative action more than an ethical claim? How to explain communicative action metaphysically? How is communicative action possible? Is communicative interaction necessary?
We will try to answer these questions in two ways: arguing "from authority" and arguing by metaphysical arguments. Th e fi rst way is the way of Plato's dilemma and the Biblical dual message about humanity, worth and cultural orders. In this way we will examine the cultural (philosophical as well as literary) foundation of the thinking in the category of duality and, last but not least, in the category of unity of the dual world. Pay attention: Plato, as well as the Bible, is called here as the witness of dualism 5 , not of monism 6 , as it occurs in popular interpretation of both complex messages.
Let's begin, however, with metaphysics, because the true beginning is in metaphysics only 7 (metaphysics is also a key to the interpretation of Plato and the Bible). Th e best known beginnings are in the myth of creation (not just the Biblical one, certainly), and in Hegel's "being and nothing". Hegel is not of interest in this paper, though it doesn't at all mean that he is not of interest in this context at all 8 .
THE DIALECTICAL METAPHYSICS
Th ere is no room for the report from history of discussion around metaphysics and even from the Habermas' approach to it. Habermas, as a sociologist fi rst of all, is found rather in the countermetaphysics camp; he is concerned about detranscendetalisation of reason and about making it free of transcendence. In the certain, strictly philosophical sense of transcendence, it is rather impossible. Th e main function of reason is transcendent and this function is the subject of metaphysics. Just a remark: we treat metaphysics as a synonym of philosophy, as its core and principal part; metaphysical questions are the questions of the absolute beginning, 5 Th ere are many kinds of dualisms. Th e dualism presented bellow is dualism of two alternative (and coexisting) modes of being's being, not (for example), the best known dualism of spirit and body, ideas and material world and so on.
6 Philosophicaly (metaphysicaly) examined foundations of being is the sphere of dualism-monism controversy, whereas pluralism belongs to the sphere of "positive" being, which is competency of science.
7 Nothing like "scientifi c" Big Bang can play role of the true beginning. 8 In the light of Hegel's philosophy a communicative action and seeking for agreement is particular and relative, whereas the action of Absolute Subject is… absolute. Th e action of Absolute Subject is necessary, the action (including communicative one) is valid, if it is well included into the frame of necessity.
of what exists certainly and how it exists, of element of being and of the source of the "energy" of being. And another "metaphilosophical" remark: metaphysics must not be "metaphysical", metaphysics should be dialectical -that is the reason why ontology is not suffi cient 9 . Th e short report from the metaphysical process, containing both the questions and answers, looks as follows 10 :
According to Cartesian tradition (also Socratic as well as, partly, Augustinian), what exists in the beginning, exists absolutely and, suitably, exists for sure, exists without doubt, is I (is Me). But, contrary to the so called "philosophy of subject" (including its Cartesian variant), it is not the full beginning, it is not only the absolute being; not just "Me" exists without doubt. Descartes had an intuition about it, but his proposal is not satisfying: "God", with his claim for full absolute status, deprives Me of any fi rst-rate metaphysical meaning; nature, as an equivalent complement of Me, also deprives it (deprives me) of a metaphysical status, turning it into the subject of knowledge, into the epistemological subject. Meanwhile Me needs something with which it might and must construct the elementary relationship. What is the other side (part) of a relationship, what relationship is in the beginning?
Th e source of my "knowledge" about Me as something absolutely existing is my own experience, which may be called "metaphysical", because it indicates something meeting metaphysical criteria, criteria of beginning, of element, of dynamics. What is also given in the experience of this kind, without any relative aspects? God, as we know, doesn't meet this criterion, because he (because it, god I mean) is done just as a notion, symbol and image, as a product of imagination, as a cultural product, as something suitably relative; nature is given by the limited number of phenomena, the 9 If ontology is about what the world is like, metaphysics is about how it becomes, how it is created. It is obvious, that there are two types of metaphysics: religious (ideological) and philosopical. Th is distinction bereaves modern (and postmodern) horror metaphisicus of grounds. wholeness of nature is just an idea 11 . What is the proper notion of all of that, giving with Me the fullness of being, the wholeness of reality, of everything existing in the meaning as above? Th e only "something", meeting those criteria, something given in metaphysical experience of separation and distinctness from Me (from what I am separated and distinct) is NotMe. Me and Not-Me 12 in experiencing separation and distinctness. Me, not reducible to anything, what is not Me, Not-Me, not reducible to any features or peculiarity of Me. Important remark: the only "feature" of Me is that I am not anything else, the only feature of Not-Me is that it is not Me. Me and Not-Me are lacking in any "positive", substantial attributes 13 . Me exists in distinctness and separation, as well as Not-Me. And, of course, in mutual connection, in a relationship.
Something in the absolute beginning is double; the element, an irreducible part (Me and Not-Me relationship of separation and distinctness) is obviously double. Th ere is nothing single in the beginning 14 , there is nothing single at all. Being is irreducibly structured. We may say that the number two is the absolute number of reality, of the "higher" reality at least, which is the subject of metaphysics. Th e number two is the number of relationship, the element of being 15 .
Separation and distinctness, metaphysical experience of separation and distinctness, needs to be put in order (arranged reality is the suffi cient proof for that need), and the act of arranging and constructing of being as ordered being begins in the frame of metaphysical experience: Me and Not-Me are forced to arrange the process of separation and becoming distinct and they do it. Th ey make a metaphysical choice, which is the key and instrument for this arrangement (arrangement the chaos of metaphysical experience, which includes the declining of separation and distinctness) and for constructive work, for creation of the "higher" being. Th ey defi ne the relationship, defi ned up to now just as relationship of separation etc., of duality of Me and Not-Me. Th e choice supports and consolidates the duality, because only two fundamental orders are possible, two fundamental types of relationship are possible. Two principal orders are possible as the result of metaphysical choice, made by two sides of the fundamental relationship, Me and Not-Me in relationship, together. Metaphysical choice gives two solutions, both equally possible and necessary. Th e fi rst: Me forces its authority on Not-Me, and Not-Me accepts it (permission as the elementary form of agreement is necessary for establishing the relationship), or Not-Me forces its authority on Me, and I agree to it. One subject of the relationship demands to be treated as a subject vielding domination over the another, treating him as the object of domination; they establish the subject -object structure of being, subject and object of domination in particular. Th e second solution: I treat Not-Me as a subject, demanding equal treatment for myself 16 ; when the choice is mutual (when the demand is accepted), both subjects construct the subject-subject structure of being. Sociologists oft en require proof that the second solution is more than an idea or utopia. From the sociological point of view the statistics (how many subjects choose the second, subject-subject type of relationship) is important to defi ne the certain sociocultural order, which may be distinguished from one based on domination. From the philosophical point of view, to ascertain just one such relationship, subject-subject relationship, founded on the base of the subject-subject metaphysical choice, is suffi cient. It is not diffi cult to fi nd even more 17 . In any case, reality is divided into subject-object and subject-subject relationships. If the choice is real, if subject-subject relationship is possible as well as subject-object (domination, power and so on), the choice itself is the clasp, unifying divided reality. Th ere is always choice, relationships are chosen, one is accepted, another -refused 18 ; the choice is absolute "being" then, connecting (and separating) relative parts of it. Choice is actually transcendence, because it is not determined by the dominating sociocultural order, although it 17 Many enough for establishing the certain type of cultural order (we may name it "democratic", or "liberaldemocratic"), among three other typical cultural orders: "archaic", founded on magic as the dominant cultural institution, "traditional", founded on religion as the institution principally diff erent from magic, despite of the mixture of both in the empirical religious cultural reality, and "consumer" culture, founded on advertising. Th e dominating institution of "democratic" culture is law in the narrow, proper meanning, as the form of agreement (alliance etc.). See more in W. Paradowska, R. Paradowski, Typology of cultures and economy in culture, "Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies" (Quarterly review, Polish Academy of Sciences), 18/2003. Remark: principal diff erence between magic and religion is rooted in the diff erence between the status of human being in relationship with a higher power, imagined fi rst and real next (or reversely). In religion, in particular, that status is described by the term "nothing".
18 To be precise, the alternative solution is refused just as the leading principle, but not in general -it is always accepted as the additional principle. See, for exemple, the role of "love of neighbeur" in the Christian ethical system with its principal rule of obedience, or the status of hierarchy and authority as an additional, limited, functional rule in the frame of the principal equality of democratic political and cultural order. is always under the strong pressure of it. If the choice is as above, the subject-subject relationship is not just a part of being (communication in Habermas' terminology), it is also the general structure of reality-I am the subject of choice in subject-subject relationship fi rst of all, but in subjectobject relationship also: in subject-object relationship the "object" has also a choice: it may, risking life (risking not being separated and diff erent), to stop supporting the subject-object relationship. It may choose to require to be treated as subject. Th e subject-subject relationship, the communicative relationship, is doubly real, not just singly, like the instrumental reason of pessimist philosophers and ideologists of domination. Now, one more remark about the notion of "subject". In the sociological, "objective" meaning, a subject is part of subject-subject relationship. Defi ned in a philosophical way a subject is the subject of subject-subject metaphysical choice. And, fi nally, a subject is not anything which "is", like a stone or fl ower. A subject "is" (subject exists) in choice only; I transform Me into subject when I am choosing. When I am choosing I transform Me into a human being 19 .
It is important to stress that fundamental choice of this kind is not a choice from an uncertain number of possiblities (like a choice among commodities in consumer culture or like diff erent ways to certain telos of teleological action), but a strictly limited choice between a subject-subject and a subject-object approach to Me and Not-Me simultaneously.
Th e metaphysical deduction may not be convincing, at least at fi rst, especially if it is not signed suitably. Th erefore, let's try to see how the dialectical metaphysics of choice works on the Platonic and Biblical material.
PLATO'S DILEMMA
Plato gives an unquestionably philosophical proposal of the fundamental "twofoldity" of being, while the philosophical status of the Bible (of the fi rst three chapters of the Book of Genesis in particular), and double image of the world, contained there, only needs proof. Th e Bible is widely regarded as something originally "religious". Only "twofoldity" permitted in the religious interpretation of the Book, is duality of good, understood as god understands it, and evil, also as god defi nes it 20 .
Th e popular interpretation of Plato's philosophy is concerned with the theory of ideas, about the ideas and their shades -the material world, and about the idea of Good as the principal one. Th is concept of Good was easily connected to the mythical concept of god, resulting with the religious system of Christianity, coming through mediation by Neoplatonic philosophy. In the same time there is some other possibility to explain Platonic design, taking the great dilemma, formulated in the dialogue Euthyphro by Socrates, asking there pointedly "What is loved of gods is holy or what is holy is loved of gods?" 21 Coming out from the narrow frames of religious terminology, remembering also the rank of the idea of Good in Plato's system and understanding that Good is only something which can be over anyone (if anything can be over any god) we may ask rather about god and good (god and worth in the more modern philosophical language): is something worthy because gods like it or the gods like it because it is worthy? Are gods over Good or is the good over the gods? Is god the sole instructor of the notion of Good (should god to be the only instructor), or should nobody be the sole instructor of the notion of Good? We may say that we have here two communicative situations. Th e fi rst one means that there is Th e Subject, Absolute Subject, Absolute Sender, communicating his notion of Good to an addressee of this announcement. Th e second: the question fi rst. If the defi nition of Good is not the opinion of the privileged subject about Good, what is Good being "over god", how is Good itself, being in so privileged a position, Good placed higher than god? Who and how defi nes Good, not dependent of any separated, independent subject, aspirating to defi ne Good arbitrarily? God as the subject of teleological action, of Creation and Domination over human beings and the world? In any case, the fi rst communicative action (teleological action in Habermas' version) means that god 22 arbitrarily defi nes Good; the second communicative action (also in Habermas' meaning) means that Good is not defi ned arbitrarily. All of that means even more: Plato's dilemma is the construction of being. More precisely: Defi ning (two ways of) is the synonym of reality. Th e reality is divided into the "God", defi ning Good, and Good, defi ned otherwise. Th e Platonic answer for the question "how" is obvious: in dialogue. Is the dialogue also a key to the unity of the divided world? In this case it plays a double role -the fi rst one is particular: the mechanism of the searching for the defi nition of Good 23 , located over every separated subject; the second is "universal": dialogue, or communicative action, communicative relationship actually, is the universal structure of reality 24 . Not hierarchy and power, not arbitrary will, like in Foucault's concept for example, but dialogue or communicative 22 We are not interested in a defi nition of God in any theological respect but just in a defi nition of "God" as a symbol or metaphor (of "arbitrarity", power, hierarchy etc., or, in the special Biblical case, as an "image of God", of nonhierarchical relationship also).
23 Th e general i d e a of Good should be transformed into the Good defi ned. Th ere is just one idea of Good and two main Goods defi ned, the Good defi ned arbitrarily and the Good defi ned in dialogue. Plato's kind of dilemma, "Dostoevsky's dilemma", should be regarded to evil: is a murder bad because gods don't like it, or gods don't like murder because it is bad. Dostoevski is known by "if God doesn't exist, everything is permitted". It is not sure that it is his position indeed. Anyway, what is the reason of not kill, if the arbitrary will is not decisive, the more so that God is just a symbol of arbitrary power (of the power of a higher level of hierarchy over a lower one)? Th e more so also that (in religious context, and, in general, in the context of ideology of authoritarian and hierarchical order) "do not kill" means "do not kill whom I forbid to kill, kill who I order to kill". G.E. Moore, for example, was very concerned about defi nition of good and was very disappointed that it is impossible to defi ne it. He found a solution in intuition (G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Cambridge 1962). Another solution is done above: the idea of good is, of course, undefi nable (it doesn't require any defi nition), but there are no problem with the defi nition of good itself, if we rememeber about two diff erent, metaphysicaly rooted, modes of the process of defi nition. Moore (and not just him) didn't see those mediation by a mode, indicated by Plato long, long ago.
24 In spite of the fact that communicative action is not the full philosophical equivalent of metaphysical choice with its (communicative action's) stress on subject and its choice of one from two possible principal types of action (subject-subject "action" instead of subject-object one). action exactly. It is not everything about the unity of the divided world (and not everything about the general formula of it). Th e empirical world, real sociocultural order should follow Good or God as primary. Dilemma should be solved. Th e solution, the universal key to the unity, was presented above: it is choice, it is freedom defi ned as choice between subject-object and subject-subject relationship. Coming back now to Plato himself: yes, theory of the ideas, of course, but taken through the dilemma. Dilemma gives dynamics to the higher world, besides elementary structure which it also gives.
BIBLE AS A BOOK OF CULTURE
And what about the Bible, about Genesis in particular? Let us place the general notion at the beginning. For people free of religious illusions, it is rather obvious that the Bible is not a "religious" book fi rst of all, that the Bible is written, of course, under the inspiration of the "holy spirit", but the "holy spirit" of artistic inspiration, as well as "holy spirit" of the political order. Th e Bible is a kind of a constitution. Anyway, the Bible is literature in the common sense of the word. Its religious and, what is the same, political function is second. We underline this especially -in our country it is not the normal view for this question.
Th e second principal observation is that the Bible is an opus with ingenious structure: myths, some kinds of poetry, including erotic, law regulations, songs, prophesies and so on. And a philosophical construction among the Bible's attributes. Th e fi rst three chapters of the Book of Genesis have a philosophical construction.
Th e fi rst three chapters of the book of Genesis don't function in culture as a philosophical message, but as a specifi c religious message-as a simple, single, uniform message about Lord God, creating the world and man, and punishing people for disobedience. At the same time the message is not single, the message is double. Th e story of genesis contains two diff erent messages about the human being, two messages about good and god, and presents two principally diff erent kinds of communication relationship-communication as domination, and communication as agreement. For this purpose the story of genesis is built of two diff erent, separated stories.
We are not going to extract every philosophical aspect of the story about creation of the world, for example the similarity to the scientifi c description of the evolution of the world in the fi rst story of creation and the diff erent description in another (that one beloved by the "creationists"), and to display the possible consequences of not one, but two elements in the beginning: "god" and "earth and heaven". Th e more so, that we are interested nowadays just in this coincidence: the structure of reality presented in Genesis, is not like in typical religious discourse, speaking about God, who created the world "in six days", made man of the dust, forbidding him to eat certain fruits, and made for him, for his pleasure, a helpful woman from a certain bone. Th e structure of reality there is rather like in Plato's dilemma, and even more: like in Habermas' theory of communicative action. Th ere is a diff erence also: the Book of Genesis (and indeed, the whole Bible) stresses even more defi nitely than Plato does the key of unity of the divided world. More defi nitely indicates what is universal.
Look at the text: God creates human beings twice: as man and woman at the same time, in the fi rst story 25 , and as a man only, in the second 26 . In the second story God creates the animals next, and at last a woman, stressing their (of woman as well as of animals) secondary rank 27 . Th ere is no hierarchy in the fi rst story, there is no interdiction to defi ne good and evil independently. But there is something more important: the notion of "image of god" is connected to man and woman not being in hierarchy 28 , not to man dominating over woman and animals, as it is in the second story. It is meaningful -the fi rst story is about nonhierarchical relationship, only the second is about hierarchical one, about domination and obedience. Only the second story has been adopted by religion as a principal message 29 .
25 Gen 1, 27. 26 Gen 2, 7. 27 Gen 2, 18. 28 Gen 1, 27. 29 Th e message of the fi rst story (nonhierarchical relationship between human beings) is adopted as la imited, secondary message ("Th e second most important com-Both stories have the continuation in the myth about displacement of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. In the story about hierarchy and domination the fruit belongs to God 30 , the highest one in the hierarchy -only the Lord God defi nes good and evil there. Th e story about displacement begins with woman, using reason: we are witness of the inner dialogue in her mind 31 . In the religious interpretation it is disobedience simply, and the third chapter of the Book of Genesis is even entitled "Human Disobedience". It is disobedience, of course, but just from a hierarchical, authoritarian pattern point of view. From the wider point of view it is looking for agreement, looking for exchange of arguments. Th e fruit, displaced from the Lord's control to woman fi rst and to man's hands next, is a symbol of this new communicative action and communicative relationship: the "fruit" of knowledge of good and evil could (and should) be divided fi rst and should be common aft erwards. "God" is "angry" at such disobedience at fi rst, and establishes the new pattern next, admitting that human ability to defi ne good and evil is equal to his own, ("Now the man has become like one of us and has knowledge of what is good and what is bad" 32 , God says). Th e covenant, the alliance will be, from this moment, the privileged "god's" pattern of relationship. Exactly like Habermas' communicative action and communicative relationship exactly 33 . mandment") in the frame of the general religious message. See Mt 22, 39 and the fi rst commandment of the Christian Decalogue, in the contents taken from Lev, 19, 18: "… love your neighbour as you love yourself ". In descriptive aspect it would be "realistic", in proper normative aspect it is simply authoritarian.
30 Gen 2, 17. Exclusive right to defi ne good is obviously exclusive right to fi x the goal, the common goal at least. In this context good and goal is the same; In both contexts good and goal is the same; just the contexts are diff erent -the manner of defi ning of good, we mean.
31 Gen 3, 1 -5. 32 Gen 3, 22. 33 We can say consequently, that reality is double and is a compound of two kinds of communicative relationships, and every kind of communicative relationship is double; nevertheless if the "duality" of the communicative relationship grounded on subjectsubject metaphysical choice is adequately structured (communicative relationship is a compoud of communicative action I and communicative action II, both directed for agreement), the communicative relationship grounded on subject-object metaphysical choice is complementary (inadequately) structured (the communicative relationship is
THE STRUCTURE OF BEING AND TWO DIFFERENT REASONS
Th ere are two principal relationships in the Bible: domination/obedience, and alliance. Th e latter is at the same time particular and universal: the alliance, the nonauthoritarian relationship, seeking for agreement, has "divine" status in the Book. Th ere is also something about beloved Habermas' cathegory of reason there. Th e fi rst, reason of authoritarian God, defi ning good and dominating over man, and man's reason of understanding interdiction and the necessity of obedience 34 , and the second: reasons of subjects, mutually admitting competency of each other to defi ne good and searching for agreement, including a critical approach to the authoritarian claims of hierarchical reason 35 . In light of the dominating patriarchal culture it is rather ironic, that, according to the Bible, the new communicative reason, the reason of searching for agreement, as well as full size metaphysical choice 36 , is introduced to human culture by woman, who is, in religious tradition, an incarnation of irrationality, and of the reason of obedience, and, generally, of the lower rank of humanity.
It is the source of the support for Habermas' concept of being as communication and for the possibility and necessity of non instrumental communication thereby: Plato, who passes, in popular understanding, for a protagonist of totalitarian order; Plato, who now appears to be a nonauthoritarian philosopher, and symbolic "fi rst woman", which has iniciated the transition from an animal existence of natural determination and "God's" absolute domination, to the human life of choice and freedom, to the disposition for communication, agreement and social contract. And, a compound there of two teleological actions, both directed instrumentally, one for domination, another for surviving).
34 And, of course, man's reason, dominating over woman, and her reason of understanding of the necessity of obedience.
35 Hierarchical reason in its classical description: Paul's "man is the head of a woman, Christ is the head of a man", etc. Every "reason" is, anyway, reason-reason relationship, hierarchical as well as "communicative".
36 Introductory form of metaphysical choice presents man accepting silently the Lord God's prohibition.
